

• Unit measure of agents [0,1]. Infinite (or very large) population.

Unit measure of goods produced [0,1]. Only one good.

Discrete time t = {1,2, ...}, infinitely lived agents.

Agents do not consume the good they produce. They trade it.



• Each period, matches occur. Trade happens if mutually beneficial.

• Probability an individual is interested trade is x. So, probability of trade  $x^2$ .

Successful trade gives utility u. Cost of production is k.

• We assume u > k so that production occurs.



## Expected utility (or value) can be calculated as

V = prob.of trade \* gain from trade +
 prob.of no trade \* gain from no trade +
 value next period

We have

$$V = x^2 * (u - k) + (1 - x^2) * 0 + \beta * V$$

$$\Rightarrow V = \frac{x^2(u-k)}{1-\beta}$$



• A proportion M is endowed with money. 0 < M < 1.

Assume individual can hold either a unit of money or of good.

• Agents chooses to accept money with probability  $\pi$  , while believing that a random member of the population accepts money with probability  $\Pi$  .

• If agents own the good, they get  $V_C$ . If they own money, they get  $V_M$ .



## **Kiyotaki-Wright**Value Function (with money)

To determine  $\pi$ , we need to compare  $V_C$  and  $V_M$ .

$$V_C = (1 - M)x^2(u - k) + \beta(Mx\pi V_M + (1 - Mx\pi)V_C)$$

$$V_M = (1 - M)x\Pi(u - k) + \beta((1 - M)x\Pi V_C + (1 - (1 - M)x\Pi)V_M)$$

$$V_M > V_C$$
 if  $\Pi > x \Rightarrow \pi = 1$   
 $V_M < V_C$  if  $\Pi < x \Rightarrow \pi = 0$   
 $V_M = V_C$  if  $\Pi = x \Rightarrow \pi \in [0,1]$